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Lecture 
IMPEACHMENT: ADVICE AND DISSENT 
SUSAN LOW BLOCH† 
In planning my contribution to the Van Alstyne celebration, I 
knew I wanted to do something challenging, but I was unsure whether 
to discuss Professor William Van Alstyne ’s significant contributions 
to First Amendment analysis, his terrific articles on Marbury v. 
Madison1 and Ex Parte McCardle ,2 or the myriad of other amazing 
works that he has produced.3 Then, it hit me: I would try to say 
something nice—and short—about Bill personally. Now that’s 
challenging!  
After all this high-powered discussion of Professor Van Alstyne ’s 
extensive and impressive scholarship, I want to round out the 
conference with some personal observations about Bill as a wonderful 
colleague and charming antagonist. Although Bill and I were never 
on the same faculty at the same time, I have been privileged to share 
many informative and enjoyable experiences with him over the years. 
I first met Bill at a Federalist Society debate at Wayne State Law 
School in Detroit. Our colleague, the late Professor Joe Grano, had 
invited us to discuss whether one can sue a sitting president. Of 
course, this debate was not merely academic. Paula Jones had begun 
her sexual harassment suit against President Clinton and the suit was 
on its way to the Supreme Court.4 Bill and I got together before the 
 
Copyright © 2005 by Susan Low Bloch. 
 † Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. J.D., University of Michigan, 
summa cum laude, 1975; law clerk to Thurgood Marshall, 1976–77; law clerk to Spottswood 
Robinson, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, 1975–76. I want to thank my research assistant 
Susan Cooke and Georgetown University Law Center for their assistance in writing this 
Lecture. 
 1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 2. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
 3. E.g., WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE AMERICAN FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2002); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte 
McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 (1973); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury 
v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1 [hereinafter Van Alstyne, Marbury]; William W. Van Alstyne, The 
Möbius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C. L. REV. 539 (1978).  
 4. Jones filed suit on May 6, 1994. The Supreme Court decided the case on May 27, 1997. 
012306 08_BLOCH.DOC  2/6/2006  10:22 AM 
1662 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1661 
debate and walked around the campus. I was nervous. Naturally, I 
thought that the president could not be sued while in office. (I still 
believe that.) Although I did not know at that point that the Supreme 
Court would unanimously reject my position,5 I did know that Bill 
disagreed with me and that he was a formidable debater. And, of 
course, I knew that the audience members—Federalists all—were 
predisposed toward his side. But he was very gracious and reassuring. 
Even during the debate, he was constructive and supportive—not the 
combatant whom I had feared. He won, of course. But I felt 
comfortable and unembarrassed. Disagreeing with Bill was most 
agreeable—even though I lost. 
Bill and I next crossed swords testifying in front of the House 
Judiciary Committee, debating whether what President Clinton was 
alleged to have done constituted an impeachable offense.6 Again our 
views differed, but this time less substantially. We both agreed that a 
president’s lying to a grand jury could constitute a “high crime or 
misdemeanor.” We agreed, as well, that the House had discretion to 
decide whether Clinton’s actions in fact warranted impeachment and 
removal. We differed only subtly in our advice to the members of the 
Judiciary Committee. I opined that the House should exercise its 
discretion and not impeach; Bill was somewhat more circumspect, but 
essentially he agreed. After making it clear that the allegations 
against President Clinton could be impeachable events, Bill 
nonetheless urged the Judiciary Committee to find another means of 
expressing a sense of disappointment in the President’s conduct. He 
urged the committee not to be “cozened out of it on some rhetoric 
that [an alternative was somehow beyond Congress’s constitutional 
reach].”7 I looked up Bill’s word “cozened”—it means beguiled. Bill 
was suggesting that the House find some remedy less drastic than 
impeachment, presumably some form of censure. Bill and I were 
equally unsuccessful with the House, which did impeach President 
Clinton. But the Senate refused to convict and remove Clinton. I 
guess that I would score that encounter with Bill a “tie.” 
 
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 684 (1997). 
 5. See id. at 694, 705–06 (rejecting presidential immunity for unofficial acts and finding 
that “the doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private 
actions against the President until he leaves office”). 
 6. Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary . 105th Cong. 230–37 (1998) (statement of 
Prof. Susan Low Bloch); id. at 237–44 (statement of Prof. William Van Alstyne). 
 7. Id. at 239 (statement of Prof. William Van Alstyne).  
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After the impeachment, Bill and I met again at a Duke Law 
School conference addressing the constitutional issues raised by the 
Clinton administration.8 I offered the conference my “Report Card on 
the Impeachment of President Clinton.”9 In general, my assessment 
was quite negative, although the Senate and the Chief Justice got 
good marks.10 Bill, very wisely, stayed out of this fray. I would like to 
think that his silence meant that he agreed with me, but I suspect that 
he was just otherwise engaged. Although I would like to score that 
occasion as a victory for me, honesty dictates that I call it at most a 
forfeit. 
Believe it or not, not all of my debates and discussions with Bill 
have concerned President Clinton’s misbehavior. Bill and I also 
disagree on such old classics as Marbury v. Madison. Actually, that is 
an overstatement. We agree on most aspects of Marbury. Indeed, 
Bill’s landmark “A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,” published 
in the 1969 Duke Law Journal,11 has been a cornerstone of my own 
research. In both my 1989 article on Marbury12 and my more recent 
article regarding the “Marbury Mystery” published in the 2003 
Constitutional Commentary,13 I relied heavily on Bill’s “Critical 
Guide.” Moreover, after my 2003 article was published, Bill offered 
some very welcome comments. Indeed, Bill and I are still debating 
the Marbury mystery. You will recall John Marshall’s marvelous tour 
de force in Marbury: He asserted the power of the federal judiciary to 
review the constitutionality of executive and legislative acts. At the 
same time, he avoided a confrontation with President Jefferson by 
concluding that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to issue a 
remedy in this particular suit by Marbury. In the “Marbury Mystery,” 
I suggested that William Marbury sued in the Supreme Court—
instead of what I showed to be an available alternative forum, the 
D.C. Circuit—for the explicit purpose of giving the Supreme Court 
the opportunity to reach this precise result: namely, asserting power 
 
 8. Symposium, The Constitution Under Clinton: A Critical Assessment, 63 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Winter/Spring 2000). 
 9. Susan Low Bloch, A Report Card on the Impeachment: Judging the Institutions That 
Judged President Clinton, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (Winter/Spring 2000).  
 10. Id. at 154, 159. 
 11. Van Alstyne, Marbury, supra note 3. 
 12. Susan Low Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John Marshall’s Selective Use of History in 
Marbury v. Madison, 1986 WISC. L. REV. 301. 
 13. Susan Low Bloch, The Marbury  Mystery: Why Did William Marbury Sue in the 
Supreme Court? , 18 CONST. COMMENT. 607 (2001). 
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without exercising it.14 I have not yet convinced Bill that this strategy 
was Marbury’s intent, but I am not giving up. Therefore, I am not 
scoring this debate yet. 
Probably most importantly, Bill and I disagree as to whether my 
husband, Rich, should get a motorcycle.15 So far, I am winning that 
battle. Obviously, I have more leverage here. Or at least I thought so 
until recently, when I found that Rich had hidden a Kawasaki 
catalogue inside a copy of the Federalist Papers. 
Our honoree at this conference stands as proof that academic 
debates can be constructive, interesting, valuable, and collegial. 
Winning is truly not everything. The academic community would be 
better off if others—both inside and outside the academy—would 
learn from the warm, charming, intelligent, generous style of the 
venerable and genuinely civil William Van Alstyne. 
 
 14. Id. at 623. 
 15. To those who have not witnessed Bill riding around campus in his leathers and 
Kawasaki, trust me: Bill is a “motorcycle aficionado.” He even wrote me a letter urging me to 
allow my husband to join the club. 
